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Abstract 
This paper analyses the risk of unemployment, unemployment duration and the risk of long-
term unemployment immediately after apprenticeship graduation. Unemployed apprenticeship 
graduates constitute a large share of unemployed youth in Germany but unemployment 
incidence within this group is unequally distributed. Our paper extends previous research in 
three dimensions. It shows that (i) individual productivity assessment of the training firm, (ii) 
initial selection into high reputation training firms and occupations, and (iii) adverse selection of 
employer moving graduates are correlated with unemployment after apprenticeship 
graduation.  
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Introduction  
Youth unemployment is traditionally low in Germany in an international perspective. In March 
2013, for example, the youth unemployment rate was 7.6% in comparison to an average rate of 
23.5% in the European Union (Eurostat, 2013). One frequently mentioned reason for the low 
youth unemployment rate is the dual apprenticeship system. Apprenticeship training improves 
the learning motivation of young people and their chances to find an adequate job after 
apprenticeship. Apprenticeships improve the transition into employment because training firms 
determine the number of apprenticeships on basis of their expected demand for skilled 
employees (Steedman, 1993; Harhoff and Kane, 1997; Franz et al., 2000; Ryan, 2001; Ryan, 
2011; Wolter and Ryan, 2011).  
Even if six per cent unemployment rate of apprenticeship graduates is comparable to the 
unemployment rate of all people in employment age (five per cent) and lower than the average 
youth unemployment rate (eight per cent; Brenke, 2013), unemployment risk between 
apprenticeship graduates differs in several dimensions such as training occupation and 
educational background (Winkelmann, 1996; Franz et al., 2000; Schwerdt and Bender, 2003; 
Franz and Zimmermann, 2002; Euwals and Winkelmann, 2004). 
This paper analyses individual, establishment and occupational characteristics that are 
correlated with unemployment risk, unemployment duration, and the risk of long-term 
unemployment when apprenticeship graduates enter the labour market. It hereby integrates 
individual ability, initial selection into training firms, and adverse selection of apprenticeship 
graduates who leave the training firm into the analysis of unemployment risk. We differentiate 
between initial selection into training firms, initial selection into training occupations and 
adverse selection after the end of the apprenticeship training into unemployment. We also 
differentiate between unemployment incidence that may have a random or even a voluntary 
element and the risk to be unemployed for more than half a year which definitely should be 
involuntary.  
Previous research on the unemployment risk of apprenticeship graduates mainly focusses on 
individual characteristics on the probability to stay in the training firm (Schwerdt and Bender, 
2003; Franz and Zimmerman, 2003; Euwals and Winkelmann, 2004), employer change intention 
of graduates (Wagner and Wolf, 2013), the duration of non-employment after apprenticeship 
(Winkelmann, 1996; Franz et al. 2000), the duration of the first job (Euwals and Winkelmann, 
2004) and the probability to find an adequate job (Büchel, 2002). Further papers are mainly 
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concerned with the complexity of job mobility of apprenticeship graduates, i.e. whether they 
change their employer and/or their occupation in order to change their career (Neal, 1999; 
Göggel and Zwick, 2012). These papers mainly ignore unemployment risk and instead identify 
individual characteristics such as educational background and gender as drivers of the 
transition from apprenticeship to work. Only a few studies in this literature on career decisions 
investigate the relevance of employer characteristics but these use only firm size (Schwerdt and 
Bender, 2003; Franz and Zimmermann, 2002; Euwals and Winkelmann, 2004). The study that 
comes closest to our approach is that by Franz et al. (2000). They estimate the duration of non-
employment for more than 1000 apprenticeship graduates on the basis of the GSOEP for the 
years 1984-1992. Analogously to our study, they include age, sex, nationality, and schooling 
background. In addition to our study, they have information on the vocational background of 
the head of household and the socioeconomic background of the head of household as well 
information on the graduate´s family and handicap status. 
Data  
We use the second longitudinal version of the Linked-Employer-Employee (LIAB) data of the 
Institute of Employment Research in Nuremberg (IAB). The data combine individual Social 
Security Records with the employer survey of the IAB Establishment Panel. The employer 
survey includes information on establishment size, sector, and industrial relations. This 
information is collected once a year. Employee data include information about daily earnings, 
labour market history, age, gender, and schooling as well as occupation for the entire 
workforce in the surveyed establishments (Jacobebbinghaus, 2008). These data are available as 
longitudinal spell data with daily accuracy. We use information of the first spell after graduation 
of all apprenticeship graduates from the years 2000-2006 captured in the longitudinal version 
of the LIAB as a quasi-pooled data set because every apprentice graduates only once and we 
therefore have exactly one observation per employee.1 When a job or the unemployment 
duration is uninterrupted, we combine spells until the apprenticeship graduate leaves the first 
employer after graduation or leaves unemployment. We use all individual, occupational and 
training firm characteristics from the last spell of apprenticeship training as covariates for the 
characteristics of the first employment or unemployment spell after apprenticeship graduation. 
                                                          
1
 The longitudinal LIAB data set only entails establishments that responded to all employer surveys in the period 
2000-2002. The data set entails individual and establishment information until 2006, however. Therefore, we 
cannot capture many additional observations when we add the years before 2000.  
3 
 
The LIAB includes the necessary information to measure the effect of individual, training firm 
and occupational characteristics on unemployment directly after apprenticeship training. In 
particular, we know the exact employment and unemployment durations and each status 
change on a daily basis (for example apprentices to skilled employee). We restrict the employee 
sample to those employees who have participated in apprenticeship training for at least 24 
months and graduated between January and August in each year. We also exclude all 
apprentices with more than one apprenticeship period. We do not have information whether 
an apprentice successfully graduated from training and therefore we need these restrictions in 
order to make sure that we do not capture drop-outs. Regular apprenticeships take between 
three and three and a half years. Apprenticeships automatically end with the final exam at the 
chambers of craft and chambers of industry and commerce. The chambers usually have 
examination periods in January and February for occupations taking three and a half years and 
in June and July for occupations taking three years.  
We drop individuals who work less than fulltime, individuals with earnings above the upper 
social security earnings limit (more than 140€ per day in Western Germany and around 120€ a 
day in Eastern Germany) and below the marginal part-time income threshold (below 11€ per 
day), because of rare cases with misreports of earnings. Furthermore, we only include 
apprentices from firms that train at least two apprentices who graduate in one occupation in a 
given year because we need the relative earnings position in a training establishment/ 
occupation/ graduation year cell as a measure of apprentice productivity (see below). We count 
spells with unemployment benefits (the incidence in our sample is about 75%) as well as 
unemployment assistance (25%) as unemployment. 
Estimation strategy 
In this section, we present our framework for measuring correlations between employer and 
employee characteristics and unemployment risk as well as unemployment duration of 
apprenticeship graduates. It is based on the familiar models of information asymmetry 
between training firms and outside firms interested in apprenticeship graduates trained 
elsewhere and the adverse selection of employer movers resulting from superior information of 
training firms (Greenwald, 1986; Gibbons and Katz, 1991; Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998; Grund, 
1999). These models assume that productivity of an employee is not observable by the market 
but by the training firm only. The training firm learns about the true productivity during the 
training period, can decide without costs whom to retain and can base the wage offer after 
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training on the true individual productivity information. It also uses this private information in 
order to counter wage offers from outside firms that are below the productivity of trained 
employees whom they would like to keep.  
Outside firms offer a wage for apprenticeship graduates based on a known productivity 
distribution of employer movers regarding observable characteristics such as occupation, age 
or gender. The information difference about apprentice productivity between the training firm 
and the market opens a wedge between the maximum wage offer of the training firm that 
equals apprentice’s productivity and the outside firm. The wedge increases with productivity 
(Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998). This widening gap between inside and outside wage offers 
makes it more attractive for training firms to keep high productivity but lay-off low productivity 
apprentices. This induces an adverse selection of those apprenticeship graduates available on 
the second hand labour market (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999; Wagner and Zwick, 2012; 
Mohrenweiser, Wydra-Sommagio and Zwick, 2014). Hence, the pool of employer movers after 
apprenticeship largely consists of relatively low productivity apprenticeship graduates2.  
Potential outside employers take into account not only the adverse selection of apprenticeship 
graduates on the second hand labour market but also the initial selection into training firms 
and occupations. The selection also contains valuable information on the expected productivity 
of the applicant because firms with certain characteristics such as large and high-wage firms 
may be able to attract more able school leavers (Franz and Soskice, 1995) and deliver a superior 
training quality (Smits, 2006). This means that we have to differentiate between individual and 
training firm characteristics because of initial selection of apprenticeship applicants and 
adverse selection of moving apprenticeship graduates when we form our hypotheses on the 
correlations between individual, training firm, and occupation characteristics and 
unemployment risk as well as unemployment duration.  
Moreover, in the interpretation of our findings we have to take into account that the group of 
employed apprenticeship graduates consists of those who stay with the training firm and those 
who switch their employer and immediately find a new job. The second group consists of those 
who voluntarily change their employer and those who are forced to look for another job. We 
cannot separate both groups and therefore it is difficult to find causal effects between the 
covariates and the unemployment variables in our multivariate regressions. However, we 
                                                          
2
 Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) introduce a disutility variable for apprentices during their apprenticeship training 
that is not correlated with productivity and unobservable to employers in order to include some exogeneous 
employer movers. 
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expect differences in the correlations of unemployment risk and unemployment for at least half 
a year directly after apprenticeship graduation. A short unemployment term might be the 
consequence of bad luck such as an unforeseen reduction in employment demand in the 
training firm or adverse regional labour market shocks. This should not hold for longer-term 
unemployment (Bender and von Wachter, 2006; Göggel and Zwick, 2012). We also should not 
forget that some unemployment spells might be voluntary search unemployment of 
apprentices who are dissatisfied with their training firms (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998). 
Especially young people might prefer to take some time in order to improve their match rather 
than to stay in an inferior employment relationship or they even might prefer to accept a short 
unemployment spell instead of jumping into an inferior match right after training (Neal, 1999). 
This might be one of the reasons that unemployment spells of young people tend to be shorter 
than those of older people (Franz et al., 2000; Zwick, 2012). In the case of voluntary 
unemployment, we have to ask however why the graduates preferred to leave the training firm 
and look for another job from an unemployment position instead of accepting the offer of a 
skilled job in the training firm. In order to be sure that the correlations with unemployment are 
those for involuntary unemployment, we also run the unemployment incidence regression only 
for those people with an unemployment spell longer than half a year (removing individuals with 
a shorter unemployment spell in this robustness check). 
Hypotheses  
Hence, we include a number of individual and training firm characteristics in our framework 
that have been used in previous papers and add three new dimensions: individual productivity, 
initial selection into training firms and occupations and adverse selection after apprenticeship. 
First, we include the individual characteristics frequently used in previous papers (Winkelmann, 
1996; Franz et al., 2000; Schwerdt and Bender, 2003; Franz and Zimmermann, 2002; Euwals and 
Winkelmann, 2004). We expect ceteris paribus that graduates with higher school certificates (in 
our case with higher secondary education, Abitur) have a lower probability of unemployment 
incidence and duration. A higher schooling background should lead to a positive initial selection 
and a lower probability of adverse selection. Therefore higher educated apprenticeship 
graduates should be preferred by the training firms and by potential employers on the second 
hand labour market.  
For females and age at apprenticeship graduation, the association with unemployment risk is 
unclear. Women might choose less risky career options because they more frequently face 
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interrupted careers than men (Blundell et al., 2013). As a consequence, young women choose 
different (“typically female”) occupations than young men and they might also choose a 
training firm with a higher retention rate and hence a lower unemployment risk after 
graduation (initial selection). In “female” occupations and high retention rate training firms, it 
therefore might be easier to find an alternative job when the apprenticeship graduate has to 
leave the training firm. Therefore unemployment incidence and unemployment duration of 
female apprenticeship graduates might be lower. On the contrary, a strong tendency to avoid 
employer switching might also stigmatise the few female employer changers and lead to a 
more adverse selection of females on the second hand labour market. This consequence might 
lead to a longer unemployment duration of female apprenticeship graduates. Older apprentices 
on the one hand might be less productive apprentices because it took them longer to finish 
school or they had a spell in the transitional system (Übergangssystem) before they started an 
apprenticeship, both of which indicate worse initial selection. Therefore age might be positively 
correlated with unemployment incidence and length. On the other hand, older apprentices 
might have worked as unskilled or semi-skilled employees for some time before their 
apprenticeship training and either were encouraged by their employer to learn a “proper 
occupation” or decided themselves to aim for a formal occupational degree in order to improve 
their career options and income. Therefore, older apprentices might be more motivated to 
avoid unemployment at the end of apprenticeship training (and be more experienced how to 
do so) or to get out of unemployment sooner than their younger peers.  
The first novel characteristic in our paper is the individual relative productivity assessment of 
the training firm. As an individual productivity assessment of the training firm, we use the 
bonus the training firm pays for the apprentice at the end of the apprentice training period 
controlling for occupation and graduation year.3 Importantly, the bonus is not visible for 
outside firms4. In more detail, we calculate the bonus as the difference between the individual 
and minimum earnings in a cell defined by training firm, occupation, and graduation year. Our 
interpretation that this measure can be taken as training firms’ relative individual productivity 
assessment of work related skills in this cell is supported by the fact that the bonus strongly 
                                                          
3
 Note that we control for cognitive abilities by including the schooling level of the apprenticeship graduate. When 
the bonus has an additional impact on unemployment risk, this might be related to work related skills relevant for 
productivity such as motivation, team work ability etc., see Mohrenweiser et al. (2014). 
4
 Greenwald (1986) notes that outside firms cannot see the complete wage structure of rival firms even if they 
have an idea of the general remuneration level in the firm. This means that outside firms might know the absolute 
earnings level of an apprenticeship graduate in another firm but they do not know their relative position in the 
earnings hierarchy of comparable apprenticeship graduates in this firm. 
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increases towards the end of the apprenticeship period (Mohrenweiser and Zwick, 2013) and 
positively correlates with the grades in the final exams (Mohrenweiser, Wydra-Sommagio and 
Zwick, 2014), with the probability to stay in the training firm (Mohrenweiser and Zwick, 2013) 
and with the entry wages of skilled workers in their first job after graduation – for stayers and 
firm changers alike – (Wagner and Zwick, 2012). If the private productivity assessment of the 
training firm is negatively correlated with unemployment incidence and length, this is an 
indicator of an adverse selection of those apprenticeship graduates who have to look for a new 
employer. This further means that training firms are more likely to keep high productivity 
apprentices. We therefore think that the bonus is negatively correlated with unemployment 
incidence and duration. 
Furthermore, we capture initial selection with training firm characteristics that are associated 
with a superior reputation of the training firm and the quality of training provided. On the one 
hand, firms with certain characteristics may be able to attract more able school-leavers, both 
concerning school grades and personality. Franz and Soskice (1995) called this phenomenon 
“the pupils’ tournament for better apprenticeships”. On the other hand, certain firms may be 
able to invest more resources in apprenticeship training, such as an apprenticeship workshop 
and professional full-time training instructors (Schönfeld et. al, 2010; Mohrenweiser, 2012) 
where apprentices can learn more during training (Wenzelmann, 2012; Mühlemann et. al, 
2013). In addition to that, the information about initial selection transmitted by training 
establishment characteristics are also informative for potential outside employers given that 
they cannot properly assess the productivity of apprenticeship graduates in the second hand 
labour market. 
Since previous research has shown the relevance of firm size in the transition process between 
apprenticeship training and skilled employment (Schwerdt and Bender, 2003; Franz and 
Zimmermann, 2002; Euwals and Winkelmann, 2004), we include this variable but also use 
additional training firm characteristics. We argue that positive initial selection is more likely in 
larger firms and in high-paying firms (Soskice, 1994; Franz and Soskice, 1995). These firms retain 
more apprentices (Mohrenweiser and Backes-Gellner, 2010). Moreover, those graduates on the 
second hand labour market may also profit from the signal of a tough initial selection.5 
Therefore, unemployment incidence should be smaller. On the contrary, unemployment 
duration might be higher because getting unemployed from a well-paying and large training 
                                                          
5
 Training firms that attract high productivity workers and high quality training firms are quite similar in terms of 
observable determinants such as larger firm size and higher wages (Franz and Soskice, 1995; Smits, 2006). 
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firm may be associated with a stronger stigma, accordingly. A similar argument applies for 
establishments with works councils that tend to be interested in avoiding dismissals of skilled 
employees (Addison, 2009; Kriechel et al, 2014). Also establishments covered by collective 
wage bargaining agreements might be inclined to keep their apprenticeship graduates because 
their training costs may be higher than those of training firms without collective bargaining.  
The last training establishment characteristics we include is the long-run establishment 
retention rate6. Establishment retention rates are relatively stable over time (Mohrenweiser 
and Backes-Gellner, 2010) and the average retention policy of training firms may be known in 
local labour markets. If apprenticeship graduates have to leave firms with a high long-term 
retention rate, they are more likely to be adversely selected than those who have to leave from 
firms with a low long-term retention rate. Therefore one hypothesis is that a high training firm 
retention rate leads to longer unemployment duration of apprenticeship graduates and a 
higher risk of an unemployment period longer than half a year because outside employers infer 
that unemployed apprenticeship graduates from these firms are an especially adversely 
selected group.7 Another probable hypothesis is however that training firms with high retention 
rates are more attractive employers and that they therefore have stronger initial selection 
criteria. This would count in favour of unemployed apprenticeship graduates and reduce their 
unemployment period accordingly. 
Finally, we take occupational retention rates8 into account. Occupations differ with respect to 
the initial selection of school-leavers because occupational careers are of different 
attractiveness. High productivity school-leavers may be more likely to select themselves in 
occupations with a higher retention rate. Hence, graduation from an occupation with a high 
retention rate reduces unemployment risk per se and in addition it might be a positive signal on 
the second hand labour market and therefore increase re-employment chances for 
unemployed apprenticeship graduates. In occupations with a high retention rate, unemployed 
apprenticeship graduates however are also more likely to carry a stigma of adverse selection in 
comparison to occupations with lower occupational retention rates, even if they voluntarily 
decide to leave their training occupation. Hence, the unemployment duration could be longer 
                                                          
6
 The retention rate is the proportion of the number of retained apprenticeship graduates on the number of all 
apprenticeship graduates in the training firm. The long-run retention rate is the average retention rate during our 
seven years observation period. 
7
 As the training firm retention rate is highly endogenous in the estimation equation of unemployment incidence, 
we do not include it here.  
8
 The occupation retention rate is defined as the share of apprenticeship graduates who do not change their 
occupation directly after their graduation divided by all apprenticeship graduates in the occupation. 
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and the risk of an unemployment period longer than half a year higher in occupations with a 
high occupational retention rate, which is in analogy to high training firm retention rates9. 
Summing up, we have the following hypotheses on associations between individual, 
establishment and occupational characteristics and unemployment incidence: apprenticeship 
graduates with a high productivity assessment by their training firms, a higher schooling 
background and possibly female and older apprenticeship graduates should have a lower 
unemployment incidence. Graduates from large, well-paying firms and from firms with works 
councils should experience a lower unemployment risk. Apprenticeship graduates in groups 
with a low unemployment risk (for example those trained in firms with high retention rates) 
might signal that they have unobservable negative characteristics (for example lower work 
related skills that are not detectable for outside firms). This stigma might lead to a longer 
unemployment spell. More specifically, we hypothesise that apprenticeship graduates from 
occupations and training employers with high retention rates and those from well-paying and 
larger training firms (possibly with works councils and collective bargaining) face longer 
unemployment spells. 
 
Results 
Descriptive findings 
We start in this section with a description of the sample (Table 1). The unemployment 
incidence is 14 per cent of apprenticeship graduates immediately after training. Those who get 
unemployed receive on average 182 days unemployment benefits and 48 per cent receive the 
benefits longer than 180 days.   
                                                          
9
 In addition, a small occupation retention rate can be interpreted as a strategy to train more apprentices than 
needed. Hence, these training firms are more likely to follow a production or substitution training strategy 
(Mohrenweiser and Backes-Gellner, 2010; Wenzelmann, 2012). The low retention rate is therefore not a result of 
pure screening and the market does not interpret the mobility as a stigma. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean  Std. dev. 
Dependent variables   
Unemployment incidence 0.14  
Length of unemployment in days if unemployed 181.42 154.30 
Proportion of those who are unemployed for more than 
half a year if unemployed 
0.47  
Individual characteristics   
Age 23.43 2.37 
Female 0.38  
Grammar school 0.13  
Earnings bonus in occupation/establishment/year cell (log) 0.93 1.07 
Training establishment characteristics   
Establishment size smaller than 250 0.19  
Establishment size 250-999 0.30  
Establishment size larger than 1000 0.51  
Western Germany 0.79  
Average daily establishment training earnings at the end of 
apprenticeship training (log)  
3.33 0.30 
Works council 0.89   
Collective bargaining 0.91  
Establishment retention rate smaller than 40% 0.18  
Establishment retention rate 40-60% 0.15  
Establishment retention rate larger than 60% 0.67  
Occupation characteristics   
Occupation retention rate smaller than 40% 0.11  
Occupation retention rate 40-60% 0.36  
Occupation retention rate larger than 60% 0.53  
Number of observations 270,168  
Notes: The number (and shares) of observations per year are: 2000: 18,560 (0.07), 2001: 32,960 (0.12), 2002: 
44,308 (0.16), 2003: 46,469 (0.17), 2004: 44,037 (0.16), 2005: 41,525 (0.15), 2006: 42,011 (0.16). The 
establishment and the occupation retention rates are calculated without the apprentice considered. 
Source: LIAB longitudinal version 2. 
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Apprentices are somewhat older than 23 years when they graduate, almost 40 per cent are 
women and 13 per cent have a grammar school certificate (Abitur). The average earnings bonus 
at the end of apprenticeship is 0.93 log points or 2.54 Euros a day. The bonus is less than 10 per 
cent of total daily earnings that are around 27 Euros or 3.3 in log (compare establishment 
average). 
On the establishment-level, most apprentices have been trained in an enterprise in West 
Germany (79 per cent) covered by collective bargaining (89 per cent) or works councils (91 per 
cent). The share of apprentices in large training firms with more than 1,000 employees is 
almost 50 per cent while 30 per cent have been trained in enterprises with 250-999 employees 
and about 20 per cent in smaller establishments. Please note that our restrictions lead to a 
more than proportionally higher share of apprentices from larger firms in our sample because 
we restrict it to training firms that have at least two apprenticeship graduates in one 
occupation in a given year. Moreover, two thirds of the training enterprises have retention 
rates of more than 60 per cent, 15 per cent have retention rates between 40 and 60 per cent 
and less than 20 per cent have retention rates of less than 40 per cent. 
On the occupation-level, we characterize occupations by the same retention rate boundaries in 
order to obtain an indicator for the degree of adverse selection on the occupation-level. The 
average occupational retention rate is 52.4 per cent and 53 per cent of the graduates receive 
an apprenticeship certificate in an occupation with a long-term retention rate of more than 60 
per cent, 37 per cent of the graduates receive one in occupations with an occupational 
retention rate between 40 and 60 per cent and, accordingly, 10 per cent in occupations with an 
occupational retention rate below 40 per cent.  
Multivariate findings 
We estimate joint associations between individual, occupation and establishment 
characteristics measured before the end of apprenticeship training and unemployment after 
apprenticeship training. We calculate these associations with unemployment directly after 
apprenticeship graduation using a Probit ML approach (Table 2, column 1). Besides the 
unemployment incidence, we also have a look at the length of unemployment spells because 
the associations between our covariates and the unemployment incidence and unemployment 
length might differ (Franz et al., 2000). One reason might be for example that for some groups 
unemployment incidence is higher but unemployment spell length is lower. In principle, we 
might expect the same signs for unemployment length as for unemployment incidence, 
12 
 
however. We distinguish between an OLS estimation of linear unemployment length (Table 2, 
column 2) and a Probit of long-term unemployment (more than half a year) in order to capture 
non-linearities (Table 2, column 3). We include occupation dummies in the regression on Table 
2 column 1 but occupation and establishment retention rate categories in the associations with 
unemployment duration and long unemployment because retention rates are highly 
endogenous in unemployment incidence estimations. 
All three estimations show the same sign for most of the regressors. On the individual-level, 
females and apprenticeship graduates with a higher schooling level have a lower risk of 
unemployment and if they get unemployed they experience a shorter unemployment duration 
and a lower risk of long-term unemployment. This pattern also holds for apprenticeship 
graduates who receive a higher earnings bonus (and therefore were more productive than their 
peers in the same establishment and occupation). On the contrary, the age coefficients change 
their signs. Older graduates have a higher risk of unemployment but if they get unemployed, 
they experience shorter unemployment duration and a lower risk of long-term unemployment.  
On the training firm-level, apprenticeship graduates from large training firms have a lower risk 
to get unemployed but the unemployment duration does not significantly differ by firm size. 
Unemployed graduates from larger firms, however, have a higher risk of long-term 
unemployment. Graduates from firms in Western Germany and from high-paying firms have a 
lower probability to get unemployed and if unemployed, they have a shorter unemployment 
duration. On the contrary, apprenticeship graduates from firms with a works council have a 
lower probability to get unemployed but if they are unemployed they have a higher risk of long-
term unemployment. Graduates from firms covered by a collective bargaining agreement do 
not differ in the unemployment risk from those graduates who come from firms not covered 
but they have a lower risk of long-term unemployment. Finally, graduates from firms with a 
higher establishment retention rate who get unemployed have a higher risk of long-term 
unemployment. On the occupation-level, graduates in occupations with a higher average 
occupational retention rate who get unemployed have lower unemployment duration and a 
lower risk of long-term unemployment.  
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Table 2: Regressions of unemployment directly after apprenticeship graduation 
Variable Unemployment 
yes/no 
Unemployment 
duration (ln) 
Unemployment 
longer than half a 
year yes/no 
Age (deviation from occupation 
mean) 
0.008*** 
(17.30) 
-0.048*** 
(4.56) 
-0.033*** 
(20.29) 
Female -0.005*** 
(2.72) 
-0.242*** 
(7.75) 
-0.037*** 
(6.58) 
Grammar school -0.061*** 
(24.25) 
-0.129*** 
(2.57) 
-0.002 
(0.19) 
Earnings bonus in occupation/ 
establishment/ year cell  
-0.004** 
(5.27) 
-0.042* 
(1.78)  
-0.017*** 
(6.46) 
Establishment size 250-999 -0.052*** 
(27.03) 
0.058 
(1.30) 
-0.014** 
(2.06) 
Establishment size +1000 -0.070*** 
(34.04) 
0.027 
(0.52) 
-0.012* 
(1.68) 
Western Germany -0.025*** 
(15.99) 
-0.158*** 
(5.43) 
-0.061*** 
(11.82) 
Daily earnings at the end of 
apprenticeship training (log)  
-0.072*** 
(29.97) 
-0.095* 
(1.85) 
-0.035*** 
(4.70) 
Works council -0.011*** 
(4.57) 
0.015 
(0.34) 
0.040*** 
(5.46) 
Collective bargaining 0.003 
(1.10) 
-0.041 
(1.04) 
-0.035*** 
(4.60) 
Establishment retention rate 40-
60% 
 0.015 
(0.30) 
0.020*** 
(3.37) 
Establishment retention rate +60%  0.032 
(0.74) 
0.018*** 
(3.33) 
Occupation retention rate 40-60%  -0.075 
(1.63) 
-0.027*** 
(3.93) 
Occupation retention rate +60%  -0.478*** 
(9.00) 
-0.275*** 
(40.54) 
Number of observations 270,168 39,152 39,152 
(Pseudo) R2 0.14 0.13 0.12 
Notes: Column (2) and (4), average marginal effects after Probit in dummy variables estimations, column (3) OLS 
estimates ,z (t)-values in brackets, significance levels: ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1, the estimations also included: 17 
industry sectors, 7 year dummies, in column (2) in addition 88 occupation dummies, in column two standard errors 
clustered at establishment level. 
Source: LIAB longitudinal version 2. 
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Interpretation 
So far, we get rather similar results as previous papers on the associations with unemployment 
for apprenticeship graduates. Analogously to Franz et al. (2000), we estimate a negative 
association between age and schooling to unemployment duration. Franz et al. (2000) do not 
find a negative association between the female gender dummy and unemployment duration, 
however. Moreover, our interpretation for the changing sign of the age coefficient between 
unemployment incidence and unemployment length is as follows: firms prefer younger 
graduates when they have to decide whom to retain or hire directly after graduation. Older 
graduates have more experience with a problematic labour market situation and therefore find 
a new job quicker when they get unemployed. It might also be the case that the share of 
involuntary unemployment is larger for younger than for older apprenticeship graduates. 
We extend the previous research on unemployment risk and duration of apprenticeship 
graduates by including three additional categories of variables: a measure of individual 
productivity, several measures of initial selection on the school-to-apprenticeship transition 
and for the degree of adverse selection after apprenticeship. First, it is not surprising that 
apprentices with a high bonus during apprenticeship training who get unemployed also find a 
new job quicker since we could show in previous papers that a higher bonus than the peers is 
correlated with better grades in the final exam in the establishment/ occupation/ and 
graduation year cell at the end of apprenticeship (Mohrenweiser et al., 2014).  
An additional point of our paper is initial selection captured by training firm characteristics such 
as large and high-paying training firms and those training firms with high retention rates. These 
establishments are more likely to have a good reputation and higher training quality and 
therefore can attract better school-leavers for apprenticeships. The signal of a better initial 
selection and/ or better training quality reduces unemployment risk and duration for 
apprenticeship graduates compared to those graduates from firms with a worse reputation. 
Moreover, works councils reduce the risk of getting unemployed because they use their 
codetermination rights on personnel matters to protect the jobs of apprenticeship graduates 
(Hirsch et al., 2010). If apprenticeship graduates from training firms with works councils get 
unemployed nevertheless, they carry a stigma because the selection of those who are not 
retained is more negative if less employees of a training firm face unemployment (Acemoglu 
and Pischke, 1998; Wagner and Zwick, 2012). Therefore these apprenticeship graduates are 
more likely to be unemployed for a longer period of time. Furthermore, we interpret the 
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positive sign of a high training firm retention rate for long-term unemployment in a similar 
manner. If an apprentice loses the job although he or she graduated from a firm that usually 
retains most of its apprentices, this is a strong indication for adverse selection. The positive 
signal that the unemployed apprenticeship graduate had been chosen by a highly attractive 
employer with a high retention rate therefore seems to play a minor role. Hence, our indicators 
for initial selection and training quality show an important impact on the risk and duration of 
unemployment after graduation of apprenticeship and the risk of long-term unemployment. 
Initial selection of school-leavers into training firms has an impact on later labour market 
careers. 
Third, we find no adverse selection in the apprenticeship-to-work transition with respect to 
occupational retention rates. We interpret the signs of the occupation retention rates on the 
unemployment duration and the risk of long-term unemployment as indications for no stigma 
of apprenticeship graduates who get unemployed in occupations with a high retention rate. It 
might be a positive quality indicator if an apprenticeship candidate can enter an occupation 
with a high retention rate – which can usually be interpreted as quality signal for the 
occupation. This positive signal seems to be more important than the negative signal of an 
adverse selection of those who get unemployed although the general retention rate in their 
occupation is high. 
We also want to stress that employer and occupation characteristics have a stronger impact on 
the explanatory value of the multivariate regressions than the individual characteristics. In the 
third model in Table 2, the individual characteristics explain 3.8% of the incidence of 
unemployment spells and the training firm characteristics additional 10.2%. In the second 
model in Table 2, the individual characteristics explain 2.7% of the variation of unemployment 
duration, the employer characteristics additionally 3.7% and occupation characteristics 
additionally 5.5%. In the third model in Table 2, the individual characteristics explain 2.5% of 
the incidence of unemployment spells longer than half a year, the training firm characteristics 
additional 5.1%, and the occupation characteristics an additional 4.2%. 
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Robustness checks 
We extensively test the robustness of our results.10 First, we repeat the Probit estimation on 
unemployment incidence without the occupation dummies. We do not find any changes in the 
results, the negative female coefficient even increased in absolute terms, however. This might 
be interpreted as a sign that not the possibility to switch between occupations drives the lower 
risk of females to become unemployed. 
Second, we also calculated the associations in Table 2 separately for Western and Eastern 
Germany. The results are remarkably similar and most associations have the same signs and 
similar strength. The association is more positive for females, the earnings bonus, the earnings 
level of firms, and works councils in Western Germany. The associations are stronger, however, 
for grammar school and larger establishments in Eastern Germany.  
Third, we compare the associations for men and women and also find remarkably similar 
results. The association is slightly more positive for grammar school, the occupation retention 
rate, and works councils for men. The association is stronger for the average establishment 
earnings at the end of apprenticeship training for women. 
Fourth, we replace the occupation retention rate dummies with the 88 occupation dummies in 
the second and third column. Again, our results remain qualitatively the same.  
Fifth, we re-estimate the associations in Table 2 and replace the dependent variable in the long-
term unemployment incidence regression (column 3) with a variable that counts only short 
unemployment spells of up-to 30 days directly after apprenticeship graduation. All significant 
coefficients in the third column switch their sign, as expected.  
Sixth, we re-estimate columns two and three in Table 2 with only one set of retention rates for 
firms or occupations. The results are remarkably similar. More specifically, the coefficients of 
the dummies for the retention rate groups stay more or less the same if we leave out the other 
retention rate groups. 
Finally, we include all apprenticeship graduates who come from the smaller training firms with 
less than two apprentices per occupation and graduation year cell. Again, our results remain 
qualitatively the same. 
                                                          
10 All regression results in this section are available from the authors on request. 
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Conclusions 
This paper investigates a broad range of associations of individual, training firm and training 
occupations characteristics with unemployment risk, unemployment duration and the risk of 
long-term unemployment (more than six months) of apprenticeship graduates immediately 
after graduation. We extend previous research by using three categories of additional variables: 
individual productivity, initial selection in the school-to-apprenticeship transition and adverse 
selection in the labour market for apprenticeship graduates.  
First, we confirm that more productive graduates are less likely to get unemployed and if they 
become unemployed they have a lower unemployment duration and a lower risk of long-term 
unemployment. Second, we capture initial selection with training firm characteristics that are 
associated with a superior reputation of the training firm. Apprentices graduating from high 
reputation firms have a lower risk of unemployment, a lower unemployment duration and a 
lower risk of long-term unemployment. Third, a strong reputation of the training firm can also 
play against the candidate. If a graduate from a firm with a works council and those from firms 
with a high establishment retention rate nevertheless gets unemployed, he or she carries a 
stigma and experiences longer unemployment duration and a higher risk of long-term 
unemployment. On the contrary, we find no adverse selection in the apprenticeship-to-work 
transition with respect to occupational retention rates. 
These results show that outsider firms come to a similar conclusion with respect to the 
productivity of apprentices as the training firm and therefore obviously discern lower and 
higher ability apprentices. Moreover, our results demonstrate the importance of initial 
selection of school-leavers by training firms for unemployment risk and duration. The 
consequences of initial selection into training firms might cause the school-leaver tournament 
for good apprenticeships as mentioned by Soskice (1994) and theoretically derived in Franz and 
Soskice (1995). Finally, our estimations show that there is adverse selection of those not 
retained by the training firms (Wagner and Zwick, 2012). Adverse selection may generate an 
additional incentive for graduates to stay in the training firm. Training firms then possess 
monopsony power after apprenticeship graduation that helps them to earn initial investment 
costs of apprenticeship training. This interpretation is supported by the fact that occupations 
with high net investments also have high retention rates (Schönfeld et. al, 2010). 
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